ABSTRACT. This Note joins a growing chorus of scholarship criticizing the lack of proportionality analysis in the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Rather than simply bemoan the current state of legal doctrine, we offer a practical test that state and federal courts could use to determine the permissible scope of pedestrian stop-and-frisks. Specifically, we propose that courts adopt an offense-severity model that distinguishes minor offenses (like jaywalking, public alcohol consumption, and simple trespass) from more serious misdemeanors and felonies. Two state supreme courts -Massachusetts's and Washington's -have already adopted part of our approach, distinguishing noncriminal from criminal activity for the purposes of stop-and-frisks. That is, police in those states may not engage in stop-and-frisks based on mere suspicion of noncriminal offenses. Our Note further advocates for a rebuttable presumption against stop-and-frisks for petty misdemeanors. To overcome this presumption, prosecutors would bear the burden of demonstrating that an officer reasonably believed the suspected offense posed an immediate threat to public safety. In advocating such a model, our Note contributes to a broader debate about crime-severity's usefulness as a rubric for assessing police conduct under the Fourth Amendment and its state law equivalents.
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INTRODUCTION
In the mid-199os, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) embraced a new strategy for crime suppression predicated on James Q. Wilson and George Kelling's "broken windows" criminological theory.' The basic thrust of that strategy has now been adopted in some form by hundreds of police departments across the country 2 Known as "order-maintenance policing," the strategy calls for a zero tolerance policy towards so-called "quality of life" offenses whose occurrence is thought to reflect crimegenerating social disorder.' In departments that follow an order-maintenance approach, officers aggressively enforce city ordinances against activities like panhandling, public drunkenness, graffiti, prostitution, and loitering. 4 The explicit aim of order-maintenance policing is to "reclaim" the streets in order to "undercut the ground on which more serious crimes seem possible and even permissible." 5 Practically speaking, it often means using aggressive enforcement of quality of life violations as a pretext to seize weapons or other contraband.' One of the primary legal mechanisms for effectuating order-maintenance policing is the stop-and-frisk. 7 A stop-and-frisk is a nonconsensual encounter between police and citizen that falls short of a full-blown arrest. The Supreme Court first recognized the procedure's constitutional legitimacy in Terry v. 461-64 (2000) (discussing NYPD's embrace of order-maintenance policing). exceedingly important, question about the stop-and-frisk: should officers be able to stop individuals on the basis of any suspected offense, no matter how minor? As the leading treatise on Fourth Amendment law notes, this question "has seldom been confronted head on by the lower courts." 11 Ordinarily, courts limit their inquiries to whether officers have reasonable suspicion that an offense is being, has been, or is about to be committed, regardless of its severity. " We argue that such an approach is both unfaithful to Terry's reasoning and misguided as a matter of policy.
In so arguing, we join a growing chorus of academic voices criticizing the lack of proportionality in the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.' 9 As these scholars have persuasively shown, the Court's "transsubstantive" approach to search and seizure law ill suits the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement.2o After all, how can courts strike a proper "balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security" ' without taking into account the seriousness of the offense the government seeks to investigate?
Where the scholarly literature has fallen short, however, is in proposing an offense-severity test that is workable both on the streets and in the courtroom. As Professor Eugene Volokh has noted: " [T] he devil is in the details. If courts can't make the severity distinctions work in practice, then the distinctions' 18. See, e.g ., State v. Kennedy, 726 P.2d 445, 448 (Wash. 1986 ) ("While there has been some dispute among critics, courts have not required the crime suspected or under investigation to be a felony or serious offense." (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (upholding a vehicle stop based on officers' reasonable suspicion of illegal entry))). REV. 1957 REV. , 1964 REV. (2004 L. REV. 439, 536 (1990) ("One relevant factor in evaluating the importance of the government's interest is certainly the nature and seriousness of the crime under investigation. As the Welsh majority suggests, a legislature's treatment of an offense as minor can fairly be said to reflect a limited governmental interest in convicting people of that offense."). merits in principle are of little consequence."" Indeed, in other Fourth Amendment contexts, the Supreme Court has cited administrability concerns as reason to avoid adopting an offense-severity model.
Our Note seeks to remedy this shortcoming by proposing a model that uses preexisting legislative classifications to define offense-severity for Terry purposes. The model has two basic components. First, it distinguishes between civil infractions or violations, on the one hand, and criminal misdemeanors and felonies, on the other. A civil infraction or violation is a regulatory offense that is ordinarily punishable by fine only. Because Terry spoke in terms of proportionate government responses to suspected criminal wrongdoing, courts should clarify that suspicion of a civil offense does not justify the intrusiveness of a stop-and-frisk. Second, our model deems Terry stops based on suspicion of petty offenses presumptively invalid. For constitutional purposes, petty offenses are criminal misdemeanors that carry a maximum possible sentence of six months in jail. 4 Applying the petty offense distinction in the Terry context makes sense because the government's law enforcement interest is least compelling, and the potential for harassment is greatest, when stop-and-frisks are premised on minor suspected crimes. Adopting a rebuttable presumption for petty offenses also helps mitigate the weightiest objections to our reliance on offense 22 . Volokh, supra note 19, at 1983. 23 . See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326, 347 (2001) (deeming constitutionally reasonable a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor punishable only by fine, explaining that " [o] ften enough, the Fourth Amendment has to be applied on the spur (and in the heat) of the moment, and the object in implementing its command of reasonableness is to draw standards sufficiently clear and simple to be applied with a fair prospect of surviving judicial second-guessing"); Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 175, 178 (20o8) (holding an arrest in violation of state law constitutionally reasonable, noting that " [i] ncorporating state-law arrest limitations into the Constitution would produce a constitutional regime no less vague and unpredictable than the one we rejected in Atwater. The constitutional standard would be only as easy to apply as the underlying state law, and state law can be complicated indeed").
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For purposes of determining whether a defendant is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has defined a "serious" crime as one for which the authorized punishment is more than six months. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S.
66, 68-69 (1970).
The Court has declined to hold that an offense carrying a maximum term of six months or less "automatically qualifies" as petty, though it has "presume [d] Likewise, though recognizing that courts may deem some offenses punishable by less than six months' imprisonment "serious," this Note adopts the six-month line in distinguishing serious from petty offenses.
categorizations -namely, that those categorizations vary across jurisdictions and are susceptible to easy legislative manipulation. The Note proceeds in five Parts. In Part I, we familiarize readers with Terry and current stop-and-frisk doctrine and practice. As we show, courts have largely avoided asking whether the offense used to justify a pedestrian Terry stop should matter in determining its legality. In Part II, we describe offenseseverity in greater detail before setting forth our proposed model in Part III. Part IV offers doctrinal and normative justifications for applying our model to pedestrian stops. Finally, in Part V, we consider several state and federal court cases that incorporate offense-severity into their Terry analyses. These cases suggest the feasibility and utility of distinguishing among suspected offenses when assessing the reasonableness of stop-and-frisks.2 6
STOP-AND-FRISK DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE UNDER TERRY
A. Stop-and-Frisk Doctrine
Ordinarily, a lawful warrantless search or seizure requires that officers have probable cause to believe that an offense has been, is being, or will be committed. 7 Terry famously departed from this standard by recognizing the constitutionality of stop-and-frisks where officers possess merely a reasonable and particularized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing.
Given the Court's "agonized opinion," 29 there was ample reason to believe Terry would be limited to its operative facts, namely those situations where
25.
See infra Part IV. As we explain therein, adopting the petty offense distinction helps mitigate these criticisms because (i) there is greater uniformity across jurisdictions in the type of behavior that qualifies as petty, and (ii) legislatures are unlikely to recategorize petty offenses as serious because doing so would be prohibitively expensive.
26.
We note our focus on pedestrian, as opposed to automobile, stops. Automobile stops implicate special regulatory and officer safety concerns. For instance, the Supreme Court has historically afforded motorists lesser privacy rights because of the "compelling governmental need for regulation" to ensure highway safety. the Court upheld as reasonable a school administrator's search of a student's purse based on nothing more than the administrator's suspicion that the student was violating a school rule against smoking.' And more recently, the Court held constitutionally permissible an invasive strip search of an individual detained for a minor offense involving the nonpayment of a fine. But at times, the Court has viewed offense-severity as highly relevant to its determination of reasonableness. In Welsh v. Wisconsin, for instance, the Court noted that "an important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists" that would justify a warrantless home arrest "is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made."" Welsh involved a warrantless entry where officers had probable cause to believe the home's occupant had recently engaged in drunk driving. 4 The Court specifically rejected the state's exigent circumstances argument, namely that its law enforcement needs necessitated immediate entry to the home to prevent the spoliation of blood alcohol evidence. Under Wisconsin law, the Court noted, driving under the influence was a "noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment [was] possible." The Court explained that " [t] his is the best indication of the State's interest in precipitating an arrest, and is one that can be easily identified both by the courts and by officers faced with a decision to arrest."5 6 Ultimately, the Court concluded that Wisconsin's minimal law enforcement interest did not trump the petitioner's reasonable expectation of privacy in his own home.
In a development that underscores how perceptions of crime-severity can shift over time, this Term the Court heard argument in a case where California urged precisely the opposite outcome. 57 The case involves a motor vehicle stop for suspicion of drunk driving based solely on an anonymous tip.ss California contends that because drunk driving poses such a serious threat to public safety, More recent circumstantial data suggest stops on suspicion of violationlevel behavior remain commonplace. For every stop, NYPD officers must complete a form-the Unified Form 250 (UF-2 5 0)-that identifies the suspected crime.
6 ' The form instructs officers to indicate the particular suspected misdemeanor or felony that serves as the basis for each stop. Between 2004 and 2009, the number of UF-250s that failed to state a suspected offense rose from 1% to 36%.6 Over the same period, the total number of stops increased 83%, from 314,000 to 576,000.70 Slightly more than 6% of those stops resulted only in the issuance of a summons.
7 ' Although it is conceivable that in each and every one of those stops officers legitimately 'unnecessary' where a violation level offense has been committed in an officer's presence. Commissioner Safir explained that, where an officer observes a violation, no 'stop' is necessary; a summary arrest may be effected. To that extent, it may be reasonable to infer that some number of 'stops' for suspected 'quality of life' violations actually resulted in 'summary arrest' -and thus were not documented as 'stop' encounters at all." (citation omitted)). In her opinion declaring the NYPD's stop-and-frisk policy unconstitutional, Judge Scheindlin provided further examples of officers emphasizing the importance of issuing summonses for violation-level offenses.
She noted that " [b] etween 2002 and 2011, the number of stops increased from roughly 97,000 to roughly 686,ooo per year." 75 How was it possible, the judge wondered, that the NYPD was able to increase stops by "roughly 700%, despite the fact that crime continued to fall during this period?"7 6 In answering her own question, she noted the following statements of NYPD supervisors:
* "If they're on a corner, make them move. 
77.
Id. at *30 (statement of Sergeant Raymond Stukes).
Id.
79. Id. at *31 (statement of Lieutenant Stacy Barrett).
That officers appear to stop people on suspicion of violations is perhaps unsurprising when one considers the contradictory testimony that NYPD supervisors have given concerning the legality of such conduct. In 1998, one NYPD commissioner accurately testified before the New York City Council that "violation-level offenses cannot lawfully support a forcible 'stop."'so But in the more recent Floyd litigation, an NYPD Inspector responded to a similar question by stating that it was his belief that officers could lawfully stop, question, and frisk based on their suspicion of "any violation of law," not just misdemeanors or felonies."
Such attitudes are not NYPD-specific. For example, in training their officers on proper stop-and-frisk tactics, Philadelphia police supervisors similarly "encourage officers to be clever and resourceful about using even minor infractions -something as routine as spitting, littering, loitering, or holding an open container of alcohol -as a rationale to stop a suspect person and conduct a legal frisk."" Because post hoc rationalizations matter a great deal in determining the legality of Terry stops, order-maintenance policing is premised on the idea that officers need only point to facts reasonably suggestive of some legal wrongdoing to satisfy the constitutional standard, and it is clear that low-level offense conduct provides the articulated justification for many stop-and-frisks. What has also become clear is that such justifications are just that-articulated. As Inspector McCormack's comments lay bare, using low-level offenses to 
Inspector Dwayne Montgomery testified as follows:
A. I would like to clarify one of my previous answers.
Q Sure.
A. The one relative to stopping a person for a felony or misdemeanor as defined in the Penal Law. We can stop for any violation of law. However, we only prepare the UF25o for the misdemeanor or a felony. justify Terry stops tends to mask more invidious reasons for stop-and-frisks, such as racial profiling."
C. The Path Not Taken
As Professor Sherry Colb reminds us, things need not have turned out this way. 5 4 Justice Harlan penned a concurrence in Terry that, had it been followed by lower courts with greater regularity, might have averted many present-day problems.* Instead of scrutinizing the reasonableness of the frisk, Harlan emphasized the need for lower courts to engage in a searching inquiry of the propriety of the initial stop. He explained that "if the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer during an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop."" Of course, "[a]ny person, including a policeman, is at liberty to avoid a person he considers dangerous."7 Justice Harlan would have therefore made clear that "the right to frisk ... depends upon the reasonableness of a forcible stop to investigate a suspected crime."" Here, then, is an implicit justification for according offense-severity significant weight in Fourth Amendment balancing. Put slightly differently, the police should not be permitted to use suspicion of minor offenses to engage in fishing expeditions aimed at ferreting out the armed and potentially dangerous. As Judge Friendly explained in unsuccessfully resisting Terry's extension to suspected narcotics possession:
Terry v. Ohio was intended to free a police officer from the rigidity of a rule that would prevent his doing anything to a man reasonably suspected of being about to commit or having just committed a crime of violence, no matter how grave the problem or impelling the need for swift action, unless the officer had what a court would later determine to be probable cause for arrest. It was meant for the serious cases of On the other hand, where the police have a reasonable basis for suspecting a serious crime is about to be committed, the law ought to permit them to act aggressively with a view towards officer safety. In Justice Harlan's words, " [t] here is no reason why an officer, rightfully but forcibly confronting a person suspected of a serious crime, should have to ask one question and take the risk that the answer might be a bullet." 9 o
II. WHAT'S IN A LABEL?: UNDERSTANDING OFFENSE-SEVERITY DISTINCTIONS
Justice Harlan's concurrence raises the obvious question: what is a "serious" offense? One possible way of approaching the question is to begin by defining what a serious offense is not. Accordingly, our task in this Part and Part III is, first, to describe how legislatures distinguish among offenses, and second, to explain why those distinctions are worthy of deference for Fourth Amendment purposes.
A. Offense Distinctions
All states distinguish between serious and minor crimes in some way. 9 ' The most common and recognizable distinction is between misdemeanors and felonies. Historically at common law, felonies were those crimes for which death and forfeiture were the prescribed punishments.
9 2 All other crimes were considered misdemeanors. Today, jurisdictions distinguish between felonies and misdemeanors primarily by the length of the authorized punishment and the place of incarceration. Misdemeanors, by contrast, encompass less serious crimes that are punishable by fines only or jail sentences of less than one year.
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Federal law and many state penal codes further distinguish some misdemeanors as "petty." 95 While statutory codes differ in precisely where they draw the line between petty and serious offenses, for constitutional purposes the Supreme Court in Baldwin v. New York defined a "serious" crime as one where the authorized term of imprisonment exceeds six months.9 6 Prior to its Baldwin holding, the Court had struggled in its efforts to distinguish petty from serious crimes, variously looking to factors like the authorized term of punishment, the crime's character as malum in se or malum prohibitum, and whether the offense was indictable at common law. 9 7 In Baldwin, the Court rejected prior approaches and simply created a constitutional floor where the crime charged authorized a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six months.9' This followed from the Court's recognition that every jurisdiction save New York City afforded defendants the right to a jury trial in such instances. 99 While the Court has since declined to hold that an offense carrying a maximum term of six months or less "automatically qualifies" as petty, it has "presume [d] 
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Id. at 71-72 ("In the entire Nation, New York City alone denies an accused the right to interpose between himself and a possible prison term of over six months, the commonsense judgment of a jury of his peers."). Federal and state legislatures are not the only actors that define offenseseverity. Municipalities also exercise considerable regulatory control by virtue of either their inherent police powers or special legislative grants of authority.'os Traditionally, courts treated municipal ordinances as creating quasi-criminal offenses, describing them as "public torts," "public welfare," "4police," or "regulatory" offenses.' 0 o The modern trend has been to characterize an offense as civil or criminal based on the penalty the ordinance authorizes or whether the ordinance has a counterpart in the state criminal code." 0 Indeed, some states have explicitly empowered municipalities to may not be imprisoned but may be subject to a fine, forfeiture, and disqualification, or any combination."). choose whether municipal offenses should be classified as misdemeanors or infractions."
B. Legislative Choices
This Section considers the factors that motivate legislatures -including municipalities -in choosing among offense classifications. Classification choices affect more than just the punishment an offender receives. They also help determine the symbolic meaning that society attaches to the offense conduct, the procedural rights to which a suspect or defendant is entitled, and the collateral consequences that result from a finding of guilt.
Criminal laws, like all laws, reflect communal judgments about social norms and social utility." 2 Those judgments are historically contingent and are shaped by prevailing cultural attitudes and technology."' Laws prohibiting sodomy and alcohol consumption are representative of the former; the enactment of Internet-crimes legislation typifies the latter.
They also serve expressive and instrumental purposes. 114 At a commonsense level, the maximum authorized punishment for an offense reflects its severity."' But categorical labels add a further layer of meaning. Civil offenses carry less opprobrium than do criminal ones, and petty misdemeanors are likewise perceived as less serious than other misdemeanors and felonies. Civil sanctions are generally nonpunitive. Misdemeanors and felonies, on the other hand, have traditionally signaled society's judgment that the offender has violated not only its social order, but its moral norms as well."
iii. See, e.g degree, the severity of the sanction expresses the importance of the violated norm.").
Offense classifications also serve an instrumental purpose by defining the scope of procedural rights afforded to suspects or defendants. Distinctions between criminal and civil offenses, or between completed felonies and completed misdemeanors, can shape the police's investigatory authority. 117 Similarly, many jurisdictions continue to adhere to the common law division between warrantless arrests for felonies and misdemeanors." 8 The former require only probable cause whereas the latter require that the offense actually be committed in the officer's presence. And a host of post-arrest procedural rights are grounded on the nature of the offense charged, including rights to counsel, 1 9 grand jury indictment, 2 o and jury trial.' Because the rights of defendants are contingent upon offense classifications, legislative choices reflect decisions about resource allocation. For instance, legislatures have reaped significant cost savings by reclassifying certain misdemeanors as violations.
1 2 2 Similarly, the six-month demarcation for petty offenses exercises a strong pull in favor of petty offense classifications because, by designating offenses as petty, legislatures can avoid the costs associated with jury trials and, potentially, court-appointed counsel. 2 3
Finally, while it is true that Fourth Amendment law generally treats all offenses alike, courts have occasionally accorded crime-severity significant weight in determining the reasonableness of police and prosecutorial actions. 1 24
In the next Part, we aim to encourage such efforts by proposing a model for stop-and-frisks that incorporates offense-severity.
III. AN OFFENSE-SEVERITY MODEL FOR STOP-AND-FRISKS
It is easy to forget that Terry itself embraced the principle of proportionality.' 5 That is to say, Terry was grounded on the idea that the government's burden in justifying a search or seizure should be inversely proportional to the law enforcement interest in effectuating that search or seizure. Unfortunately, the Court has applied the proportionality principle in its Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiries only infrequently since Terry.12 6 Our model calls for a return to Terry's fundamental principle by encouraging courts to explicitly incorporate offense-severity into their analyses of stop-and-frisks. The model's underlying premises are twofold. First, because legislative offense classifications represent considered democratic judgments about offense-severity, they are entitled to substantial deference. Second, the strength of the government's law enforcement interest depends on the severity of the underlying crime that it is seeking to detect or prevent.
We think these premises represent a commonsense understanding of reasonableness capable of accommodating both the dignitary and privacy interests of individuals as well as the legitimate needs of law enforcement. But we also recognize that the utility of our proposal depends on its ease of application. To that end, in this Part we offer a brief description of how our model would work in practice.
Under our model, a court reviewing a pedestrian stop would begin by identifying the suspected offense and how the relevant jurisdiction categorizes it. Significantly, it would do so prior to interrogating the objective reasonableness of the particularized facts cited in support of the officer's actions. Where the offense in question is a civil violation or infraction, the court would deem the stop and any subsequent frisk unjustified, and its work would come to an end. To be sure, if there were debate as to whether the stop was based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause, the court would need to 
Butsee Welsh, 466 U.S. 74o.
inquire into the facts surrounding the stop. But stops based on the mere suspicion of noncriminal behavior would be categorically invalid.
In contrast, if the offense in question met the constitutional definition of a petty misdemeanor, the stop or stop-and-frisk would be deemed presumptively invalid. To overcome this presumption, the prosecution would bear the burden of demonstrating that the officer reasonably believed the suspected offense posed an immediate threat to public safety.' 2 7 Accordingly, a court following our model would only proceed to consider the objective and particularized facts underlying the basis of a stop-and-frisk in three scenarios: (i) where there is a dispute as to whether the officer had reasonable suspicion or probable cause; (ii) where the officer claims that a suspected petty misdemeanor constituted an immediate threat to public safety; or (iii) where the suspected crime was a nonpetty misdemeanor or felony. The penalties attached to the latter crimes are prima facie evidence of their severity and the substantial law enforcement interest in combating them.
Our offense-severity model would also apply to an officer's decision to frisk a suspect. While the stop and the frisk involve analytically distinct inquiries, courts routinely consider the nature of the suspected offense as a factor in the frisk analysis -as they should.2' But they typically treat offense-severity as a one-way ratchet that permits officers to automatically frisk where the suspected crime is one in which the suspect is likely to be armed and dangerous.'" 9 Our proposal encourages courts to treat frisk justifications with greater skepticism where the suspected offense is minor. Logically, the offense that gives rise to a stop ought to inform the reasonableness of an officer's fear that a suspect is armed and dangerous.
Consistent with current case law, our model would primarily apply to stops that are initiated on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause. A police officer who witnesses a civil infraction has probable cause to either temporarily detain the suspect for the purpose of issuing a citation or, where permitted, effectuate an arrest.o Our proposal respects that power. However, in jurisdictions where the legislature has not authorized arrest for violations and infractions, even where committed in an officer's presence, frisks would be subject to a rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness.
IV. DOCTRINAL AND NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR OUR OFFENSE-SEVERITY MODEL
In this Part we argue that our model offers a practical mechanism for incorporating offense-severity into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, finds support in Terry and its progeny, and is buttressed by a number of public policy considerations. Our model assumes added importance in light of recent moves by state legislatures to decriminalize marijuana possession and other minor offenses."
Post-Terry, courts and scholars have disagreed on whether and how to assess the severity of an offense when determining Fourth Amendment reasonableness. As described in Part I, the Supreme Court has generally refused to define the reasonableness of a search or seizure according to the severity of the offense at issue. ' 3 In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, for example, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid warrantless arrests for even minor crimes, such as nonjailable seatbelt violations.' 33 In the rare instances where the Court has offered an explanation for its decision to forgo crime-severity analysis, it has focused on administrability problems. The Court's concerns are threefold: first, courts have no principled way of dividing serious crimes from minor ones; 3 4 second, officers on the street cannot be expected to distinguish categories of crime;s 35 and third, even if officers could 130. 1 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 91, § 3.5(a). Scholars insist, on the other hand, that it is problematic to treat all offenses identically. 137 But they cannot agree on how or where to draw the lines. Professor Jeffrey Bellin, for example, has argued for the classification of crimes into "grave," "serious," and "minor."13 Under Bellin's formulation, courts "channeling the views of a hypothetical reasonable person" would make these determinations. 139 Yet, relying on post hoc judicial determinations poses the very administrability problem the Supreme Court has warned about. Other commentators to consider the issue have similarly failed to adequately address the administrability concern.
Marijuana Resource
4 o These failures are part of what makes our proposal attractive. Since our model piggybacks on preexisting legislative classifications and a settled brightline constitutional rule, there is no need to worry about the inconsistencies of ad hoc judicial lawmaking, thereby addressing the first of the Court's administrability concerns. By contrast, given the Supreme Court's reluctance to adopt any kind of judicially created hierarchy of crimes, scholarly proposals that rely on judicial determinations alone are impractical.141 know the details of frequently complex penalty schemes, but that penalties for ostensibly identical conduct can vary on account of facts difficult (if not impossible) to know at the scene of an arrest" (citation omitted)). Likewise, under our proposal, police officers need not master a complex set of vaguely drawn distinctions like those between "grave," "serious," and "minor" crimes; this addresses the Court's second administrability concern. Of course, in the real world, "officers can and regularly do make ex ante judgments that separate one class of crimes from another, because that is an important part of their job." 14 ' But if, as the Supreme Court suggests, such difficult line-drawing judgments are generally to be avoided, the distinctions between noncriminal, petty, and serious offenses are straightforward and "can be easily identified both by the courts and by officers faced with a decision to [stop or] arrest." 43 Indeed, in analyzing stops for completed offenses, some federal circuit courts already require police to distinguish misdemeanors from felonies.144 Other courts, while declining to embrace such a bright-line rule, have effectively adopted a presumption that officers should not stop people for completed misdemeanors unless those misdemeanors threaten public safety.4s If courts believe police can readily distinguish any completed misdemeanor from a felony, there is little reason to suspect they cannot similarly distinguish violations and petty offenses from more serious crimes.
The Court's third administrability concern-that the boundary between offense categories is too thin-does not pose an intractable problem for our model. For every crime, officers must know the elements of the crime in order to initiate a proper stop. For instance, statutes decriminalizing simple possession of marijuana specify an ounce limit; above that limit, possession viable one, even for federal constitutional law. Third, while it is true that some variability exists in petty offense categorizations across jurisdictions, the Court has never found such variability unduly troubling when defining the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Nor has it articulated a compelling justification for why Fourth Amendment rights should be treated differently. Finally, the Court in Moore explicitly noted that states retain the ability to impose higher standards on searches and seizures than required by the Constitution. Id. at 172. ("While '[i] a per se standard that police may not conduct a Terry stop to investigate a person in connection with a past completed misdemeanor simply because of the formal classification of the offense. We think it depends on the nature of the misdemeanor. Circumstances may arise where the police have reasonable suspicion to believe that a person is wanted in connection with a past misdemeanor that the police may reasonably consider to be a threat to public safety.").
remains a crime. The Atwater Court made much hay of this distinction by noting that officers executing arrests cannot be expected to know whether "the weight of the marijuana [is] a gram above or a gram below the fine-only line."'* 6 That may be true in the arrest context, but in terms of Terry stops based on reasonable suspicion such a concern is misplaced. Quantity is an obvious element of the offense. In order to have reasonable suspicion of criminal (or non-petty) activity, an officer must necessarily possess some indication that the quantity is of a criminal (or non-petty) amount. Importantly, that does not mean that all well-founded suspicions will turn out to be correct.
A recent case in Massachusetts, where possession of small amounts of marijuana has been decriminalized, deftly handled this issue.' 47 We discuss the case more fully in Part V below. Here, it is sufficient to note the court held that where police officers have reasonable suspicion that someone possesses marijuana, but have no indication that the amount exceeds the criminal limit, reasonable suspicion of a crime is lacking.14 8 Observation of small amounts of marijuana or detection of marijuana odor does not adequately support the inference that an individual is engaged in criminal activity. The court's decision implies that officers must be able to point to some indicia of quantity-an informer's tip, visual observation by the officers, drug paraphernalia in plain view, or even a bulge in the suspect's pants pocket-to justify reasonable suspicion.' 49 Our proposed model admittedly represents a tradeoff between crime suppression and individual rights. After all, one of the central tenets of modern order-maintenance policing is that minor acts of legal wrongdoing may be indicative of more serious illegality. Notwithstanding powerfiuil criticisms of the efficacy of order-maintenance policing,' 50 we acknowledge the potential for our model to reduce crime suppression at the margins. Such tradeoffs, however, are generally an unavoidable aspect of criminal procedure law. As Judge Scheindlin stated in Floyd: "Many police practices may be useful for fighting crime-preventive detention or coerced confessions, for example-but because they are unconstitutional they cannot be used, no matter how effective."' 5 ' We also think this particular tradeoff is justified for doctrinal and policy reasons. While perhaps less intrusive than other kinds of searches and seizures, the dignitary harms to individuals subjected to a stop-and-frisk are real and substantial. " [I] t is simply fantastic," the Terry Court wrote, "to urge that such a procedure performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a 'petty indignity.' It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly." 1 5 2 That is why Terry's focus, as one state's highest court recognized, was on "preventing crimes, and promoting the interests of justice in arresting felons," which suggests the government's interest in preventing and investigating lesser offenses should not be accorded the same weight.1 3 Beyond its doctrinal consistency, an offense-severity model is also worth adopting for at least three public policy reasons. First, our society should aim to close the gap between stop-and-frisk doctrine and practice that has emerged in the decades following Terry. As one court has held, "In light of the lower risk to society involved with civil infractions, the common law principle . . . suggests that a less intrusive procedure would be more acceptable than with the commission of a felony or even a misdemeanor."' 4 Our offense-severity model aims to close the Terry gap by linking practice more faithfully with the public and officer safety concerns that permeated the Terry opinion. Since minor public order offenses implicate safety to a lesser degree than do criminal offenses, public policy interests counsel against upholding such stops.
Second, embracing offense distinctions provides courts with an objective basis for preventing law enforcement from using stop-and-frisks pretextually. 5 As Judge Friendly noted in reference to a stop for narcotics possession, " [t] here is too much danger that, instead of the stop being the object and the protective frisk an incident thereto, the reverse will be true." 6 Indeed, as described in Part I, critics of Terry have complained that officers routinely engage in pretextual stops based on impermissible factors such as race. Employing our model would help divorce stop-and-frisk procedures from these problematic practices. Finally, making use of offense-severity distinctions respects the considered judgments of legislatures and voters described in Part II. Those judgments are entitled to deference because crime control is a quintessentially local matter. As one scholar has noted, "[i]t . . . makes intuitive sense that the substantive definition of crimes should emanate from locals, who at once can give expression to specific social and geographic conditions, and, as the criminal law does more generally, single out particular behaviors for sanction."
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There is a danger, of course, that deferring to legislative classifications will lead to a one-way ratchet whereby legislatures transform every civil infraction into a criminal offense, and every petty misdemeanor into a major one. Scholars have, in fact, repeatedly accused legislatures of engaging in such overcriminalization.1 5 But the opposite has actually occurred in recent years.' 59 For a variety of reasons, legislatures have increasingly embraced decriminalization."'o Hence, one of the primary criticisms of legislatures -that they always favor expansive substantive crime definitions to the detriment of defendants -is empirically false. Moreover, while we are not oblivious to this danger, we do think it overstated. As the Atwater Court pointed out in refusing to create a constitutional rule against warrantless misdemeanor arrests, it is "only natural that States should resort to this sort of legislative regulation, for ... it is in the interest of the police to limit petty-offense arrests, which carry unlikely to be a legislature's predominant concern when considering offense classifications.
Critics might also object that offense distinctions vary considerably among jurisdictions. Indeed, as noted above, the Supreme Court in Moore ridiculed the idea that "Fourth Amendment protections" could "be made to turn upon such trivialities.11 6 2 Our model incorporates the constitutional petty offense line in part to address this criticism. A general presumption against Terry stops for petty crimes reduces offense variability while also recognizing the comparably lesser law enforcement interest in detecting and prosecuting such crimes. Moreover, while the lack of uniformity among jurisdictions is regrettable, such distinctions are not altogether meaningless. Federalism embraces the idea of localities as laboratories for experimentation.' 6 3 That localities choose to define offenses as noncriminal rather than criminal, for instance, is indicative of such experimentation. And as the accelerating trend towards marijuana decriminalization suggests, those who favor shrinking criminal liability often exercise considerable influence, notwithstanding frequent scholarly claims to the contrary.
V. APPLYING THE OFFENSE-SEVERITY MODEL
Judicial opinions are skewed towards discussing citizen-police encounters that result in the seizure of incriminating evidence. Relying on those opinions to analyze the constitutionality of Terry stops is therefore problematic because it tends to highlight the tired debate of whether it is ever desirable to let the criminal go free because the constable blundered.' 6 * What often gets omitted from the surrounding discussion are the countless searches and seizures that do not result in the discovery of contraband. Consider that fewer than one in nine recorded stop-and-frisks by the NYPD leads to an arrest or summons. any measure, that is an alarming rate of false positives for encounters based on reasonable suspicion. And citizens victimized by such false positives suffer a real invasion of privacy, the collective costs of which are nearly impossible to quantify. Because the law is nevertheless shaped by judicial opinions, our focus in this Part is on state and federal court cases that adopt elements of our offenseseverity model. These cases demonstrate that our model provides a practical and doctrinally sound mechanism for applying proportionality analysis in reviewing stop-and-frisks.
A. The Noncriminal/Criminal Distinction
This Section examines two state supreme court cases that embrace a noncriminal/criminal distinction for Terry stops. Each case stands for the proposition that police may not engage in Terry stop-and-frisks where the offense suspected is noncriminal in nature. As such, they represent an important limitation on order-maintenance policing tactics.
In State v. Duncan, a stop initiated on suspicion of an open container infraction resulted in the discovery of a gun and stolen goods.'" Seattle police officers approached three men at a bus stop to question them about a nearby half-empty beer bottle.' 6 After smelling alcohol on one of the men, Demetrius Duncan, the officers cited him for possession of an open container, a civil infraction under Washington law.' Subsequently, based on the officers' knowledge of Duncan's record and his bulky jacket, they frisked him, finding a handgun, a stolen purse, and stolen credit cards."9 6 Duncan was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm, possession of a stolen firearm, and possession of stolen property. 7 o The trial court granted his motion to suppress, but the Washington Court of Appeals reversed.' 7 '
In reinstating the trial court's order, the Supreme Court of Washington rejected the state's invitation to "extend" the Terry exception to non-traffic civil infractions.172 Instead, it clarified that Terry applies only to criminal behavior. The court reasoned that because noncriminal offenses involve a lower safety More recently, in Commonwealth v. Cruz, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reached a conclusion similar to Duncan in a case involving a suspected marijuana offense. 7 1 The court held that "the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion is tied, by its very definition, to the suspicion of criminal, as opposed to merely infractionary, conduct." 17' The primary question in Cruz was whether marijuana odor provided justification for officers to order the defendant, a passenger in an illegally parked vehicle, to exit the vehicle and submit to a search of his person. The officers in Cruz were driving down a Boston street when they spotted a car parked in front of a fire hydrant. 177 The officers recognized the car's passenger, Benjamin Cruz, from his previous encounters with law enforcement. 175 Suspicious, the two officers pulled up beside the driver for the ostensible purpose of investigating the civil offense. 17" As they approached the vehicle, an officer observed Cruz smoking a cigar and smelled a "'faint odor' of burnt marijuana."iso Based on that odor, together with the driver's nervous behavior and statement that he had smoked marijuana earlier that day, officers ordered both the driver and Cruz out of the car."' Prompted by officer questioning, Cruz then acknowledged having crack cocaine on his person12
Much like the Supreme Court of Washington in Duncan, the Cruz court stated that "to order a passenger in a stopped vehicle to exit based merely on suspicion of an offense, that offense must be criminal.""' The court found that, because Massachusetts had decriminalized possession of less than one ounce of marijuana,1"* to order Cruz to exit the vehicle, the police officers would have odor, even when combined with the defendant's statement that he had smoked earlier that day, was not sufficient.18 6 Consequently, the court held that the crack cocaine should have been suppressed as the fruits of an illegal seizure. 8 7 Because the initial "stop" of the vehicle was justified by the parking violation,' officers were permitted to ask the defendant whether he had been smoking marijuana, but only for the purpose of issuing a civil citation.'"9
Readers may legitimately wonder about the practical implications of Duncan and Cruz as proxies for the consequences of implementing our model more broadly. Because Duncan was decided more than a decade ago, Washington's experience is more revealing. On the positive side, Duncan has not caused Washington's legislature to ratchet up its classification of minor offenses in order to expand the scope of permissible predicates for Terry stops. Indeed, the legislature has since authorized a ballot measure, which voters subsequently approved, to legalize possession of small amounts of marijuana. The Seattle Police Department (SPD), in turn, recognized that public consumption of marijuana is merely an infraction, the policing of which constitutes the Department's "lowest law enforcement priority."' 90 Additionally, marijuana odor does not provide probable cause for a vehicle search.' 9 ' SPD recently went so far as to return confiscated marijuana to street dealers because it fell below the legally prohibited amount.192 Duncan itself has been followed by Washington appellate courts' 93 and extended to parking infractions.' 9 4 It has also been cited in the Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys' manual on searches and seizures, which instructs On the other hand, evidence that Duncan has directly affected police practices is lacking. That can be blamed in part on the fact that the SPD did not keep data on Terry stops until it agreed to do so pursuant to a recent settlement agreement with the Department of Justice (DOJ).19 6 Consequently, it is impossible to compare police practices before and after Duncan. We do know, however, that SPD policies in recent years have been troubling. The DOJ's summary of its investigative findings states that "SPD's policy and practices blur the line between a social contact or casual encounter, and a temporary investigatory detention pursuant to Terry v. Ohio." 1 97 It also noted that according to a 20o9 report by SPD's Office of Professional Accountability, forty percent of those subjected to stop-and-frisks believed officers lacked a reasonable ground for stopping them.' 8 In recommendations for a proposed consent decree, the ACLU similarly found a perception that SPD "engage [s] in contacts with people of color on suspicion of minor infractions or misdemeanors." 99 It recommended that a host of civil violations and misdemeanors -including "jaywalking and other pedestrian infractions, obstruction, disorderly [conduct] , littering, and pedestrian interference" -be added to SPD's "Lowest Law Enforcement Priority" list.
2 oo The settlement agreement between the city and DOJ requires SPD to revise its manual to "prohibit investigatory stops where the officer lacks reasonable suspicion that a person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in the commission of a crime.""2o While this voluntary revision is welcome, SPD's history provides all the more reason for courts to rigorously scrutinize the purported justification for Terry stops and insist on a clear distinction between noncriminal and criminal behavior. Prior to Hensley, the Supreme Court had not considered the lawfulness of investigatory stops for completed, as opposed to imminent or ongoing, crimes.
20 7 The Hensley Court determined that such stops were in fact lawful, but explicitly cabined its holding to completed felonies only.20o While declining to define the precise limits on investigatory stops for all completed crimes, 209 the Court advised that any test to identify such limits would have to balance "the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal security against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion. Hensley emphasized the particular threat that felonies pose to public safety. The Court explained that "the law enforcement interests at stake in these circumstances outweigh the individual's interest to be free of a stop and detention that is no more extensive than permissible in the investigation of imminent or ongoing crimes." 11 " Hence, by negative implication at least, the Court's opinion suggests minor crimes may not pose a threat significant enough to justify Terry stop-and-frisks.
Both federal and state courts have relied on Hensley to invalidate the use of Terry stops for completed misdemeanors. Although these cases also involve completed offenses, their holdings similarly emphasize law enforcement's comparably weaker interest in preventing and prosecuting misdemeanors, as opposed to felonies.
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Grigg, for example, held that mere suspicion of a completed misdemeanor could not justify a Terry stop when the offense posed only a minimal threat to public safety. The case involved the misdemeanor offense of playing a car stereo too loudly, a crime easily distinguished from that in Hensley: "[I]t is difficult to imagine a less threatening offense than playing one's car stereo at an excessive volume. The absence of any danger to any person arising from the misdemeanor noise violation here does not support detaining the suspect as promptly as possible."2
The Grigg court acknowledged that the "nature of the misdemeanor" must be taken into account for Fourth Amendment purposes. Obviously, and by definition, misdemeanor offenses are punished less severely than gross misdemeanors or felonies. Additionally, the legislature has provided that an officer may not make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor unless the offense is committed in the officer's presence. We consider this to be a legislative recognition that the public concerns served by warrantless misdemeanor arrests are in some degree outweighed by concerns for personal security and liberty. At the very least, because misdemeanor offenses are considered less serious crimes than felonies and because police cannot arrest for misdemeanors unless the offense is committed in their presence, the public concerns served by seizures to investigate past misdemeanors are less grave than the concerns served by seizures to investigate past felonies and gross misdemeanors.220
For these reasons, the court in Blaisdell imposed a per se rule that Terry stops are impermissible for past crimes that do not meet the statutory definition of a gross misdemeanor."
215. Id. 216. Id. ("An assessment of the 'public safety' factor should be considered within the totality of the circumstances, when balancing the privacy interests at stake against the efficacy of a Terry stop, along with the possibility that the police may have alternative means to identify the suspect or achieve the investigative purpose of the stop."). In Minnesota, a felony is an offense punishable by more than one year in jail, whereas a misdemeanor is an offense punishable by no more than ninety days in jail. A gross misdemeanor is simply defined as "any crime which is not a felony or misdemeanor," i.e.,
The distinction between completed and ongoing crimes is undoubtedly relevant to determining whether police action is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, but it should not be courts' only, or even predominant, concern. True, the exigencies Officer McFadden encountered in Terry are absent where the suspected offense has already occurred."' But the government nonetheless has a "strong interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice. "223 Offense-severity seems to us a far more relevant barometer of the state's interest in preventing and prosecuting crime than does the suspected offense's temporal proximity to the search or seizure. And Hensley, Grigg, and Blaisdell all recognized this role for offense-severity in analyzing the Terry stops in question. Furthermore, while lower court decisions since Hensley have tended to focus exclusively on the felony/misdemeanor distinction, the petty offense distinction provides a more administrable dividing line for constitutional purposes, as we have suggested in this Note. That is because, in contrast to the felony/misdemeanor distinction, which the Court has previously described as "highly technical" and "arbitrary,"
224 the petty offense distinction is readily identifiable and capable of easy implementation both on the street and in the courtroom.
CONCLUSION
Our Note has several important implications. First, defense lawyers should be more aggressive in challenging the lawfulness of stops based on suspicion of infractions and other minor offenses. Our sense is that the problem is exacerbated by the fact that much objectionable conduct escapes judicial review entirely. Second, courts should make clear that reasonable suspicion of civil violations does not justify Terry stops under the Fourth Amendment or equivalent state constitutional provisions. While decisions invalidating Terry stops on the basis of state statutes would be welcome, courts should go further by establishing a constitutional floor below which states may not go. Third, frisks that occur subsequent to stops for minor offenses should be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. Logically, the severity of an offense should inform an officer's determination of a suspect's potential dangerousness. Finally, opponents of stop-and-frisk practices should give serious consideration to those offenses punishable by more than ninety days, but no more than one year, in jail. lobbying state legislatures to decriminalize certain offenses -trespass, disorderly conduct, and drug possession, for example -that commonly serve as bases for intrusive Terry stops.
To be sure, applying an offense-severity distinction to Terry stops is not a panacea for all that ails Fourth Amendment law. But it is a step in the right direction. At a minimum, distinguishing merely infractionary conduct from that which is criminal would assuage some of the concerns of Terry's opponents. Doing so might also restore faith in the initial rationale for the Terry exception: ensuring police are not engaged in fishing expeditions, but are instead focused on preventing and solving the most serious crimes.
